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Abstract  This  paper  presents  empirical  evidence  on  the  interrelationship  that  exists  between
the evolution  of  the  Emerging  Markets  Bonds  Index  (EMBI)  and  some  macroeconomic  variables
in seven  Latin  American  countries;  two  of  them  (Ecuador  and  Panama),  full  dollarized.  We  make
use of  a  Cointegrated  Vector  framework  to  analyze  the  short  run  effects  from  2001  to  2009.  The
results suggest  that  EMBI  is  more  stable  in  dollarized  countries  and  that  its  evolution  inﬂuences
economic  activity  in  non-dollarized  economies;  suggesting  that  investors’  conﬁdence  might  be
higher in  dollarized  countries  where  real  and  ﬁnancial  economic  evolution  are  less  vulnerable
to external  shocks  than  in  non-dollarized  ones.
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Dolarización  y  relación  entre  EMBI  y  fundamentos  en  los  países  latinoamericanos
Resumen  Este  documento  aporta  la  evidencia  empírica  de  la  interrelación  existente  entre  la
evolución del  Indicador  de  Bonos  de  Mercados  Emergentes  y  ciertas  variables  macroeconómicas
en 7  países  latinoamericanos,  de  entre  los  cuales  2  de  ellos  (Ecuador  y  Panamá),  están  ple-
namente dolarizados.  Utilizamos  el  marco  del  vector  cointegrado  para  analizar  los  efectos  a
corto plazo  desde  2001  a  2009.  Los  resultados  indican  que  el  Indicador  de  Bonos  de  Mercados
Emergentes  es  más  estable  en  los  países  dolarizados,  y  que  su  evolución  ejerce  una  inﬂuencia
sobre la  actividad  económica  de  las  economías  no  dolarizadas,  lo  cual  apunta  a  que  la  conﬁanza
de los  inversores  pudiera  ser  superior  en  los  países  dolarizados,  donde  la  evolución  económica
real y  ﬁnanciera  es  menos  vulnerable  a  los  shocks  externos  que  en  los  países  no  dolarizados.
© 2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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Figure  1  Total  Central  Government  Debt-to-GDP  ratio  (%).
(Latin  American  countries’  evolution.)
100
120
140de  cambio.
1. Introduction
The  global  ﬁnancial  and  economic  crisis  of  2008--2009  had
a  much  smaller  impact  on  emerging  Latin  American  mar-
kets  than  on  their  US  and  European  counterparts.  While
Latin  American  countries  have  continued  to  grow  and  do  not
present  major  macroeconomic  imbalances,  the  advanced
economies  still  do  not  present  solid  recovery  (Figs.  1  and  2
jointly  with  Tables  1  and  2,  show  the  evolution  of  GDP  growth
and  of  the  government-debt-to-GDP  ratio  in  the  two  groups
of  countries).  The  marginal  exposure  of  banks  in  emerg-
ing  markets  to  US  subprime  assets  and  their  governments’
expansive  monetary  and  ﬁscal  policies  to  stimulate  aggre-
gate  demand  might  explain  these  differences  (see  Aizenman
et  al.,  2013).  However,  some  authors  have  analyzed  whether
exchange  rate  regimes  have  played  a  part.1
This  paper  has  two  main  objectives.  The  ﬁrst  is  to  empir-
ically  investigate  the  role  of  fundamentals  in  the  reduced
vulnerability  to  shocks  observed  in  the  bond  markets  of
seven  Latin  American  countries,  and  how  this  reduced
vulnerability  has  in  turn  affected  macroeconomic  funda-
mentals.  The  second  is  to  determine  whether  there  are
any  differences  between  countries  that  can  be  attributed
to  their  exchange  rate  regime.  Speciﬁcally,  we  aim  to  com-
pare  countries  with  and  without  a  fully-dollarized  economy.
To  this  end,  we  empirically  assess  the  relationship  between
key  economic  factors  such  as  the  external  debt-to-exports
ratio  and  inﬂation,  and  the  Emerging  Markets  Bonds  Index
(EMBI)2 during  the  sample  period  2001--2009.  In  the  second
1 The results are not conclusive, though. Whilst Krugman (2013)
shows how Eurozone members have had more trouble managing
their debts than countries outside it, Rose (2013) suggests that the
exchange rate regime does not matter.
2 The JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bonds Index Global tracks
total returns for traded external debt instruments in emerging mar-
kets. The EMBI Global includes US dollar-denominated Brady bonds,
loans, and Eurobonds with an outstanding face value of at least
$500 million. Daily historical index levels have been reported since
December 31, 1993. See Morgan (1999) for more details.
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Figure  2  Total  Central  Government  Debt-to-GDP  ratio  (%).
(Evolution  of  the  US  and  European  countries.)
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Table  1  Annual  GDP  rate  of  growth.
Year  Argentina  Brazil  Colombia  Chile  Mexico  Ecuador  Panama
2001  −4.45  1.31  1.71  3.35  −0.03  3.97  0.00
2002 −10.84  2.65  2.48  2.19  0.77  4.11  2.40
2003 8.76  1.15  3.91  3.92  1.39  2.82  4.68
2004 9.03  5.71  5.34  6.03  4.21  8.24  7.46
2005 9.18  3.15  4.71  5.60  3.07  5.32  6.94
2006 8.51  3.95  6.68  4.58  4.97  4.33  8.44
2007 8.65  6.09  6.90  4.53  3.22  2.07  12.57
2008  6.71  5.17  3.59  3.67  1.37  6.33  10.10
2009 0.86 −0.33 1.61 −0.99  −4.74  0.63  3.86
2010 9.16 7.53 3.97 5.73 5.20  3.59  7.44
2011 8.86 2.73 6.67 5.89 3.83 7.75 10.82
2012  1.88  1.02  4.20  5.50  3.94  5.11  10.93
Table  2  Annual  GDP  rate  of  growth.
Year  Belgium  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Portugal  United  States
2001  0.80  1.83  4.19  4.98  1.86  1.97  0.94
2002 1.35  0.92  3.43  5.41  0.45  0.76  1.77
2003 0.80  0.89  5.94  3.72  −0.04  −0.91  2.79
2004 3.27  2.54  4.36  4.19  1.73  1.56  3.79
2005 1.75  1.82  2.28  6.08  0.93  0.77  3.35
2006 2.66  2.46  5.50  5.50  2.19  1.44  2.66
2007 2.88  2.28  3.53  4.97  1.68  2.36  1.78
2008  0.98  −0.08  −0.21  −2.16  −1.15  −0.01  −0.29
2009 −2.80  −3.14  −3.13  −6.38  −5.49  −2.90  −2.80
2010 2.32  1.72  −4.94  −1.06  1.72  1.93  2.50
2011 1.76  2.02  −7.10  2.16  0.47  −1.25  1.84
s
e
a
q
o
i
ﬂ
a
t
d
a
N
A
m
s
g
a
R
e
c
r
t
r
w
t
t
p
t
s
r
c
f
p
2
i
n
or  ‘‘investor’s  sentiment’’)  on  risk  premium  (Eichengreen
and  Mody,  1998;  Kamin  and  Von  Kleist,  1999;  Schuknecht2012 −0.13  0.01  −6.37  
tage  of  the  study,  we  aim  to  establish  whether  there  are  rel-
vant  differences  in  the  two  groups  of  countries  (dollarized
nd  non-dollarized  economies).
A  review  of  the  empirical  literature  shows  that  our  ﬁrst
uestion  has  usually  been  approached  through  an  analysis
f  the  main  determinants  of  country  risk  premium.3 For
nstance,  Edwards  (1986)  uses  data  on  yields  of  167  bonds
oated  by  13  Least  Developed  Countries  (LDC)  between  1976
nd  1980  to  analyze  the  factors  that  determine  the  coun-
ry  risk  premium.  He  presents  evidence  that  bond  spreads
epend  positively  on  the  countries’  level  of  indebtedness
nd  negatively  on  the  level  of  investment  they  undertake.
ogués  and  Grandes  (2001),  focusing  on  monthly  data  for
rgentina  between  1994  and  1998  and  estimating  its  econo-
etric  model  by  OLS,  conclude  that  endogenous  factors
uch  as  the  external  debt-to-exports  ratio,  the  ﬁscal  deﬁcit,
rowth  expectations,  contagion  effects  or  political  noise
re  the  determinants  of  Argentina’s  country  risk.  Gónzalez-
ozada  and  Levy  Yeyati  (2008),  however,  estimating  panel
rror-correction  models  of  emerging  spreads  on  high-yield
orporate  bonds  in  developed  markets  and  international
3 Country risk refers to the likelihood that a sovereign state (bor-
ower) may be unable and/or unwilling to meet its obligations
owards foreign lenders and/or investors (Krayenbuehl, 1985).
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ates  (US  Treasury  bills)  and  using  high  frequency  (monthly,
eekly  and  daily)  data  from  33  emerging  economies,  ﬁnd
hat  global  (exogenous)  factors  explain  over  50  per  cent  of
he  long  run  volatility  of  emerging  market  spreads.
To  sum  up,  the  country  risk  premium  has  generally  been
roxied  in  the  literature  by  sovereign  spreads.  Speciﬁcally,
he  spread  of  JP  Morgan’s  EMBI  Global  index  over  US  Trea-
uries  bills  in  Latin  America  countries  is  the  most  important
eference  for  prospective  investors  in  this  area.
The  research  so  far  on  the  determinants  of  country  risk
an  be  classiﬁed  in  three  groups.4 First,  certain  authors  have
ound  a  signiﬁcant  correlation  between  macroeconomic-
olitical  variables  and  the  risk  premium  (Hoti  and  McAller,
004;  Baldacci  et  al.,  2008;  Aizenman  et  al.,  2013).  Authors
n  the  second  group  have  emphasized  the  effect  of  exoge-
ous  factors  (global  factors,  contagion  effects,  capital  ﬂowst  al.,  2009,  2010).  Finally,  authors  in  the  third  group
4 The literature on country risk is essentially four decades old. The
wo pioneering articles were published by Frank and Cline (1971)
nd Feder and Just (1977). Since then, authors have attempted to
stablish the determinants and the econometric criteria to esti-
ate, evaluate, and forecast country risk in different economies.
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relate  country  risk  and  the  exchange  rate  regime.  They
consider  that  investors  want  to  know  two  major  compo-
nents  of  country  risk  premium:  the  currency  premium,  which
can  be  measured  as  the  yield  spread  between  non-dollar-
denominated  and  US  dollar-denominated  sovereign  debt  of
the  same  borrowing  country,  and  the  credit  premium,  mea-
sured  as  the  yield  spread  between  the  dollar-denominated
sovereign  debt  of  the  emerging  country  and  US  Treasury
bills.  There  is  a  certain  consensus  inside  the  third  group  of
authors  that  dollarization  and  hard  pegs  would  substantially
reduce  the  country  risk  of  emerging  countries  (Domowitz
et  al.,  1998;  Rubinstein,  1999;  Schmukler,  2002).
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  this  branch  of  the
literature  by  examining  the  impact  of  macroeconomic  fun-
damentals  on  risk  premium  and  vice  versa,  since  movements
in  government  bond  yields  may  have  signiﬁcant  macroeco-
nomic  consequences,  (see  Caceres  et  al.,  2010).
The  literature  on  the  determinants  of  EMBI  in  speciﬁc
Latin  American  countries  is  still  scarce.  Fracasso  (2007), a
good  reference  for  Brazil  (he  shows  that  foreign  investors’
appetite  for  risk  impacts  substantially  on  EMBI  spreads)5;
Nogués  and  Grandes  (2001)  for  Argentina,  who  highlight  that
devaluation  risk  elimination  may  not  have  a  statistically
signiﬁcant  impact  on  country  risk  (other  macroeconomic
variables  such  as  the  external  debt-to-exports  ratio  and
growth  expectations  present  a  higher  impact);  Vargas  et  al.
(2012),  for  Colombia,  who  present  evidence  that  improve-
ment  of  ﬁscal  variables  reduces  the  sovereign  risk  premium;
López  Herrera  et  al.  (2013)  for  Mexico,  who  ﬁnd  long-run
relationships  between  domestic  macroeconomic  variables
and  the  Mexican  EMBI;  Lindao  Jurado  and  Erazo  Blum  (2009)
for  Ecuador  who  conclude  that  debt  and  the  inﬂation  are  the
most  important  factors  for  explaining  its  country  risk;  Délano
and  Selaive  (2005),  who  examine  Chilean’s  EMBI  behaviour
and  conclude  that  approximately  25%  of  the  variability  of  the
sovereign  spread  is  due  to  global  factors,  and  ﬁnally  the  IMF
(2010)  which  emphasizes  that  achieving  investment  grade
lowers  Panamanian  debt  spreads  by  over  140  basis  points.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2
discusses  the  theoretical  framework  while  Section  3  outlines
the  data  and  the  econometric  model  used  in  the  empiri-
cal  analysis.  Section  4  reports  the  main  empirical  results,
comparing  dollarized  and  non-dollarized  countries.  Finally,
Section  5  presents  the  main  conclusions.
2. Country risk and EMBI determinants
2.1.  The  equilibrium  condition  for  a  risk-neutral
lender
Following  Edwards  (1986),  in  an  emerging  or  developing
country  that  cannot  affect  the  world  interest  rate,  the  cost
of  external  funds  is  formed  by  two  concepts:  (1)  the  risk-
free  world  interest  rate  (i*)  and  (2)  a  country  risk  premium
(s)  related  to  the  probability  of  default  perceived  by  the
lender  (p).  In  the  case  of  a  one-period  loan,  where  in  case  of
5 In ﬁnancial jargon, the investors’ degree of risk aversion is usu-
ally called ‘‘investor appetite for risk’’.
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efault  the  lender  loses  both  the  principal  and  the  interest,
he  equilibrium  condition  for  a  risk-neutral  lender  is:
1  −  p)[1  +  i∗ +  s]  =  (1  +  i∗) (1)
From  here,  the  country  risk  premium  is:
 =
(
p
1  −  p
)
k  (2)
here  k =  1  +  i*.
Since  the  probability  of  default  depends  positively  on
he  debt-to-GDP  ratio,  as  the  seminal  article  by  Eaton  and
ersowitz  (1981)  demonstrated,  the  country  then  faces  an
pwards-sloping  supply  curve  for  foreign  funds.  As  the  prob-
bility  of  default  approaches  one,  the  country  risk  premium
pproaches  inﬁnity  and  a  credit  ceiling  will  be  reached.  The
ountry  in  question  will  have  difﬁculties  gaining  access  to
he  world’s  credit  market.  If  the  variables  that  comprise  the
robability  of  default  perceived  by  lenders  were  known,  the
ountries  might  be  able  to  improve  them  in  order  to  reduce
t  to  zero.
According  to  Edwards  (1986),  p  has  the  following  logistic
unction:
 = exp
∑
ˇiXi
1  +  exp∑ˇiXi (3)
here  Xi are  the  determinants  of  the  sovereign  risk  premium
nd  ˇi are  the  corresponding  coefﬁcients.  Combining  (2)  and
3), taking  logarithms  and  adding  a  random  disturbance  ε,
he  equation  to  be  estimated  is:
og  s  =  log  k  +
∑
ˇiXi +  ε  (4)
The  signs  of  this  equation  change  slightly  if  the  model
s  described  in  terms  of  returns.  Transforming  Eq.  (1),  we
btain:
1  −  p)[1  +  r∗ −  s]  =  (1  +  r∗) (5)
here  r*  is  the  risk-free  world  return  and  s represents,  this
ime,  the  reduction  in  terms  of  return  on  the  bond  invest-
ent,  and  k*  =  1  +  r*.  Our  Eq.  (4)  then  only  changes  the  signs:
og  s  =  log  k∗ +
∑
ˇiXi +  ε  (6)
Moving  terms,  we  obtain  the  emerging  country  return
epending  on  the  same  determinants  of  country  risk:
og  s  −  log  k∗ +
∑
ˇiXi +  ε  (7)
.2.  Determinants  of  each  country  return  index
oth  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  have  highlighted  a
arge  number  of  variables  that  may  affect  the  evolution  of
overnment  debt  returns  in  emerging  countries.6 We  can
plit  these  variables  into  three  groups:  economic-ﬁnancial,
ocio-political,  and  global  factors.
Table  3  details  some  of  the  variables  used  in  the  empir-
cal  literature  by  a  wide  range  of  authors  to  explain  the
6 See Hoti and McAller (2004) and Maltritz and Molchanov (2013),
hich present a summary of the explanatory variables and econo-
etric models used in previously published empirical articles.
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Table  3  Variables  used  in  the  literature  on  sovereign  returns’  analysis  in  emerging  countries.
Variable  Description/authors
Economic  and  ﬁnancial  variables
Debt-to-GDP  ratio  The  most  important  variable,  since  in  most  theoretical  models  of  foreign
borrowing  it  is  included  as  an  important  triggering  factor  to  borrowers  to  default
(Eaton  and  Gersowitz,  1981;  Edwards,  1986,  1986).  It  has  also  been  included  in
empirical  studies  (Aizenman  et  al.,  2013;  Eichengreen  and  Mody,  1998).
International  reserves  to  GNP  or  GDP  Measures  the  solvency  held  by  a  country.  (See  Edwards,  1986;  Aizenman  et  al.,
2013; Rowland  and  Torres,  2004,  to  name  a  few).
Investment-to-GNP/GDP  ratio;  GDP
per  capita  growth;  Industrial
production.
These  variables  capture  the  country’s  prospects  for  future  growth.  There  are
other variables  used  in  the  literature,  though,  such  as  the  growth  rate  measured
by the  difference  between  the  logs  of  GDP  in  time  t  and  t  −  1.  (See  Nogués  and
Grandes,  2001;  Edwards,  1986  or  Aizenman  et  al.,  2013)
Current account-to-GNP/GDP  ratio  Solvency  variables.  (See  Edwards,  1986;  Nogués  and  Grandes,  2001;  or  Aizenman
et al.,  2013).
External  debt  service-  to-  exports
ratio;  External  debt-  to-  GDP  ratio;
External  debt-  to-  exports.
These  variables  capture  the  intertemporal  liquidity  situation  of  a  country.
(Edwards,  1986;  Nogués  and  Grandes,  2001;  Aizenman  et  al.,  2013;  Rowland  and
Torres, 2004).
Imports-to-  GNP  ratio;  Trade
openness  (Exports  plus  Imports)  %
of GDP;  Terms  of  trade
These  variables  gauge  the  importance  of  trade.  (See  Edwards,  1986;  Aizenman
et al.,  2013;  or  Baldacci  et  al.,  2008)
Index of  real  effective  exchange  rate  See  Edwards  (1986)  or  Gónzalez-Rozada  and  Levy  Yeyati  (2008).
Fiscal balance-  to-  GDP  ratio.  This  variable  measures  the  country’s  ﬁscal  sustainability.  (See  Nogués  and
Grandes,  2001;  Gónzalez-Rozada  and  Levy  Yeyati,  2008;  or  Baldacci  et  al.,  2008).
Inﬂation rate  See  Baldacci  et  al.  (2008)  or  Aizenman  et  al.  (2013).
Social and  political  variables
Political  noise  Nogués  and  Grandes  (2001)  focused  on  Argentina  and  tested  the  political  noise
associated  with  the  resignation  of  the  Minister  Cavallo  through  a  dummy  variable
that took  the  value  1  in  the  period  of  uncertainty  that  led  to  his  resignation.
Global factors
External  ﬁnancial  shocks  Nogués  and  Grandes  (2001)  capture  them  using  the  rate  of  the  30-year  US
Treasury  bonds,  whilst  Gónzalez-Rozada  and  Levy  Yeyati  (2008)  use  the  10-year
US Treasury  rate.
Contagion  effects  They  can  be  captured  either  by  dummies  or  by  variables  such  as  other  countries’
returns. For  instance,  Nogués  and  Grandes  (2001)  included  the  JP  Morgan  Price
index of  Mexican  bonds  to  measure  its  relationship  with  the  country  risk  of
Argentina.  They  expected  that  the  historical  similarities  (in  terms  of  economic
policy  and  response  to  external  shocks)  between  Mexico  and  Argentina  would
result in  a  similar  behaviour  of  their  governments’  returns,  beyond
fundamental-based  reasons.
Market  sentiment  Diaz  Weigel  and  Gemmill  (2006)  analyze  a  sample  of  emerging  countries  using
variables  such  as  US  and  regional  stock  returns  or  oil  prices  as  proxies  of  global
ket  s
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Index  (iai)  in  Mexico,  the  Industrial  Index  (ii)  in  Brazil,  the
Industrial  Production  Index  (ipi)  in  Chile  and,  ﬁnally,  the  rev-
enues  from  taxes  to  cross  the  Canal  in  the  case  of  Panama.7factors  and  mar
eterminants  of  government  debt  returns  in  emerging
ountries,  whilst  Table  4  describes  the  variables  used  in  our
odel.
. Data and  empirical approach
.1.  Data  and  variables
able  4  provides  the  description  of  the  variables  along  with
he  data  sources.  We  included  four  endogenous  variables  in
ur  econometric  model.  The  EMBI  (with  its  monthly  aver-
ge  calculated  from  daily  data,  in  order  to  eliminate  its
eteroscedasticity  and  because  the  rest  of  variables  are
b
N
tentiment.
vailable  at  this  frequency),  along  with  variables  that  are
nly  reported  monthly,  such  as  the  Economic  Activity  Index
eai).  This  variable  was  used  to  measure  the  growth  perspec-
ive  in  the  case  of  Argentina,  Colombia  and  Ecuador,  while
he  growth  perspective  was  proxied  by  the  Industrial  Activity7 The Economic Activity Index for Argentina, Ecuador and Colom-
ia is presented as the monthly proxy of GDP by their respective
ational Statistic Institutes. In the case of Mexico we use the Indus-
rial Activity Index instead of the Global Economic Activity Index
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Table  4  Variables  used  in  our  comparative  study.
Variable  Observations  Source
LEMBI  country  Monthly  average  has  been  calculated
from  daily  reported  JP  Morgan  EMBI.
Datastream
LEAI, LIAI,  LII,  LIPI,  LREV  (These
variables  represent  growth
expectations.  The  variable  used
depends  on  data  availability  in
each  country).
LEAI:  Economic  activity  index  in
Argentina,  Colombia  and  Ecuador.
LIAI:  Industrial  activity  index  in
Mexico.
LII: Industrial  Index  in  Brazil.
LIPI:  Industrial  production  index  in
Chile.
LREV:  Revenues  from  taxes  levied  in
the Panama  Canal.
Argentina:  Statistical  National  Institute
(www.indec.mecon.ar)
Brazil:  Brazilian  Statistical  and
Geographical  Institute  (www.ibge.gov.br)
Colombia:  Central  Bank  of  Colombia
Republic  (www.banrep.gov.co)
Chile:  National  Statistical  Institute
(www.ine.cl)
Ecuador:  Central  Bank  (www.bce.ec)
Mexico:  National  Statistical  and
Geographical  Institute  (www.  Inegi.org.mx)
Panama:  National  Contraloria
(www.contraloria.gob.pa)
INF Inﬂation  statistics  in  the  case  of
Ecuador,  but  in  the  rest  of  the
countries  the  difference  in  the
Consumer  Prices  Index  is  used
Ecuador:  Central  Bank
Rest  of  countries:  ECLAC.
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In  Panama  we  used  this  variable  because  all  the  other  sectors
of  its  economy  depend  on  Canal  activities,  as  do  other  mar-
kets  such  as  the  labour  market.  The  other  monthly  variables
are  the  inﬂation  rate  (inf),  which  was  has  been  calculated
from  the  Consumer  Price  Index  in  all  the  countries,  except
in  Ecuador  where  it  was  directly  recorded,  and  the  external
debt-to-exports  ratio  (debt x),  which  captures  the  current
account  solvency  of  emerging  countries.
The  impact  of  global  risk  factors  will  be  captured  through
the  inclusion  of  dummies.
3.2.  Econometric  approach:  identiﬁcation  of  the
short  run  structure  in  the  Cointegrated  VAR  (CVAR)
Consider  the  Cointegrated  VAR  model  in  the  so-called
reduced  form  representation:
xt =  1xt−1 +  ˛ˇ′xt−1 +  ˚Dt +  εt, εt∼IN(0,  ˝)  (8)
Pre-multiplying  (8)  with  a  non-singular  p  ×  p  matrix  A0,
we  obtain  the  so-called  structural  form  representation:
A0xt =  A1xt−1 +  ˛ˇ′xt−1 +  A0˚Dt +  vt, vt∼INp(0,  ˙)
(9)where  A1 =  A01,  a  =  A0˛,  vt =  A0εt
The  short  run  equations  consist  of  p  equations  between
p  current  variables,  xt,  p(k  −  1)  lagged  variables  (xt−i,
because the latter, not only does not include all the sectors of
the economy, but also is still a preliminary variable that is being
adjusted by private and public enterprises over time. Indeed, in
Mexico, the Industrial Index has historically been used as a proxy of
GDP because their strong co-movements (OECD, 2012). Brazil and
Chile models include the Industrial Index as well, but this time the
reason is data availability constraint.
4
4
F
t
datio  Economic  Commission  of  the  Latin
American  and  Caribbean  countries  (ECLAC).
 =  1,  . .  ., k  −  1),  and  r  lagged  equilibrium  errors,  (ˇc)′xt−1.
dentiﬁcation  of  the  r  long  run  relationships  requires  at  least
−1  restrictions  on  each  relationship,  while  identiﬁcation
f  the  simultaneous  short  run  structure  of  the  p  equations
equires  at  least  p−1  restrictions  on  each  equation.
Keeping  the  properly  identiﬁed  cointegrating  relation-
hips  ﬁxed  at  their  estimated  values,  i.e.  by  treating  (ˇc)′xt−1
s  predetermined  stationary  regressors,  as  in  the  case  of
xt−i,  it  is  easier  to  identify  the  simultaneous  short  run
tructure.  We  identify  the  long  run  relationships  ﬁrst,  and
hen  the  short  run  adjustment  parameters.
The  unrestricted  short  run  reduced  form  model  is  iden-
iﬁed  exactly  by  the  p  −  1 zero  restrictions  on  each  row
f  A0 =  I.  Further  zero  restrictions  on   1, ˛  and  ˚  are
ver-identifying.  Thus,  the  process  of  identiﬁcation  consists
rstly  in  individually  testing  whether  all  lagged  variables,
he  long  run  structure,  and  dummy  variables  are  statistically
igniﬁcant  in  the  system.  The  next  step  is  to  remove  the  non-
igniﬁcant  variables  from  the  system,  so  that  the  generally
dentiﬁed  model  only  contains  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients.  The
igniﬁcant  coefﬁcients  will  identify  the  short  run  adjustment
arameters  and  the  long  run  relationships  that  affect  the
ependent  variables  of  our  simultaneous  equations  system
hich  is  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood.8
.  Empirical results
.1.  Econometric  stepsirst,  we  estimated  an  unrestricted  VAR  for  each  coun-
ry  with  the  following  structure:  Xt =  [EMBI,  eai,  inf,
ebt x].  Previously,  all  the  variables  were  transformed  into
8 This section relies heavily on Juselius (2006).
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Table  5  Residual  analysis.
(a)  Argentina
Tests  for  autocorrelation  and  lag  length  determination
Model  k  T  Regr  Log-Lik  SC  H-Q  LM  (k)
VAR(2)  2  102  20  1060.174  −17.160  −18.385  0.582
VAR(1) 1 102  16  1032.474  −17.343  −18.323  0.000
Univariate  statistics
ARCH(2)  Normality  R-squared
DLEMBI M ARG 3.732  [0.155] 5.806  [0.055] 0.697
DLEAI 0.252  [0.881] 0.204  [0.903] 0.945
DINF 12.131  [0.002]  4.875  [0.087]  0.852
DLDEBT X  1.473  [0.479]  17.219  [0.000]  0.416
(b) Brazil
Tests  for  autocorrelation  and  lag  length  determination
Model  k  T  Regr  Log-Lik  SC  H-Q  LM  (k)
VAR(3)  3  102  13  1052.667  −18.283  −19.079  0.212
VAR(2) 2  102  9  1031.318  −18.590  −19.141  0.031
VAR(1) 1  102  5  1018.918  −19.072  −19.378  0.151
Univariate  statistics
ARCH(3)  Normality  R-squared
DLEMBI  M  BRA  6.537  [0.088]  7.799  [0.020]  0.353
DLII 0.337  [0.953]  0.048  [0.976]  0.417
DINF 1.399  [0.706]  2.892  [0.236]  0.516
DLDEBT X  5.180  [0.159]  1.851  [0.396]  0.336
(c) Colombia
Tests  for  autocorrelation  and  lag  length  determination
Model  k  T  Regr  Log-Lik  SC  H-Q  LM  (k)
VAR(2) 2  102  20  946.132  −14.924  −16.149  0.722
VAR(1) 1 102  16  909.039  −14.922  −15.902  0.000
Univariate  statistics
ARCH(2)  Normality  R-squared
DLEMBI  CO  2.497  [0.287]  5.191  [0.075]  0.501
DLDEBT X  1.316  [0.518]  2.178  [0.337]  0.553
DLIMACO 1.075  [0.584]  9.972  [0.007]  0.887
DINF 0.783  [0.676]  1.328  [0.515]  0.661
(d) Chile
Tests  for  autocorrelation  and  lag  length  determination
Model  k  T  Regr  Log-Lik  SC  H-Q  LM  (k)
VAR(3)  3  102  24  1133.568  −17.874  −19.344  0.138
VAR(2) 2  102  20  1107.698  −18.092  −19.317  0.004
VAR(1) 1 102  16  1082.957  −18.332  −19.313  0.001
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Table  5  (Continued)
Univariate  statistics
ARCH(3)  Normality  R-squared
DLEMBI  CH  6.776  [0.079]  1.367  [0.505]  0.632
DLIPI 1.186  [0.756] 0.389  [0.823] 0.858
DINF 0.208  [0.976] 2.704  [0.259] 0.609
DLDEBT X  0.848  [0.838]  0.252  [0.882]  0.608
(e) Mexico
Tests  for  autocorrelation  and  lag  length  determination
Model  k  T  Regr  Log-Lik  SC  H-Q  LM  (k)
VAR(4)  4  102  17  773.042  −12.074  −13.116  0.189
VAR(3) 3  102  13  748.491  −12.318  −13.115  0.002
VAR(2) 2  102  9  714.167  −12.371  −12.922  0.000
VAR(1) 1  102  5  693.836  −12.698  −13.004  0.003
Univariate  statistics
ARCH(4)  Normality  R-squared
DLEMBI  MX  8.903  [0.064]  3.879  [0.144]  0.654
DIAI 16.944  [0.002]  1.125  [0.570]  0.547
DINF 11.197  [0.024]  2.921  [0.232]  0.558
DLDEBT X  7.688  [0.104]  3.403  [0.182]  0.409
(f) Ecuador
Tests  for  autocorrelation  and  lag  length  determination
Model  k  T  Regr  Log-Lik  SC  H-Q  LM  (k)
VAR(2)  2  139  20  1978.853  −25.633  −26.635  0.081
VAR(1) 1  139  16  1931.693  −25.522  −26.324  0.000
Univariate  statistics
ARCH(2)  Normality  R-squared
DLEMBI  M  EC  9.820  [0.007]  12.068  [0.002]  0.741
DLEAI 1.248  [0.536]  0.021  [0.990]  0.663
DINF 2.059  [0.357]  0.065  [0.968]  0.775
DLDEBT X  4.122  [0.127]  2.100  [0.350]  0.469
(g) Panama
Tests  for  autocorrelation  and  lag  length  determination
Model  k  T  Regr  Log-Lik  SC  H-Q  LM  (k)
VAR(2)  2  102  20  1039.011  −16.745  −17.970  0.589
VAR(1) 1  102  16  1016.394  −17.027  −18.007  0.029
Univariate  statistics
ARCH(2)  Normality  R-squared
DLEMBI M  PANA 1.942  [0.379]  3.805  [0.149]  0.614
DLEREV C  0.118  [0.943]  1.647  [0.439]  0.745
DINF 3.593  [0.166]  0.162  [0.922]  0.634
DLDEBT X 0.335  [0.846] 2.609  [0.271]  0.617
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Table  6  Johansen  tests.
p  −  r  r  Eig.  value  Trace  Trace  Frac95  P-value  P-Value  p  −  r  r Eig.  value  Trace  Trace  Frac95  P-value  P-value
(a)  Argentina  (b)  Brazil
4 0  0.253  57.195  53.353  47.707  0.004  0.013  4  0  0.356  84.746  77.834  63.659  0.000  0.002
3 1  0.124  26.531  25.002  29.804  0.117  0.166  3  1  0.226  39.058  36.872  42.770  0.115  0.178
2 2  0.106  12.589  11.831  15.408  0.131  0.167  2  2  0.112  12.412  11.780  25.731  0.782  0.824
1 3  0.007  0.781  0.714  3.841  0.377  0.398  1  3  0.001  0.114  0.110  12.448  1.000  1.000
(c) Colombia (d)  Chile
4 0  0.263  51.127  49.007  47.707  0.022  0.037  4  0  0.271  52.125  49.204  47.707  0.017  0.035
3 1  0.138  19.146  18.491  29.804  0.493  0.540  3  1  0.131  19.239  18.217  29.804  0.487  0.560
2 2  0.029  3.502  3.242  15.408  0.932  0.947  2  2  0.037  4.696  4.139  15.408  0.837  0.886
1 3  0.004  0.454  0.343  3.841  0.500  0.558  1  3  0.007  0.741  0.549  3.841  0.389  0.459
(e) Mexico  (f)  Ecuador
4 0  0.375  74.024  67.332  47.707  0.000  0.000  4  0  0.289  66.145  61.757  47.707  0.000  0.001
3 1  0.141  25.549  23.741  29.804  0.147  0.219  3  1  0.195  29.970  28.117  29.804  0.048  0.078
2 2  0.089  9.849  8.448  15.408  0.298  0.426  2  2  0.064  6.956  6.563  15.408  0.589  0.634
1 3  0.003  0.303  0.283  3.841  0.582  0.595  1  3  0.000  0.001  0.001  3.841  0.970  0.972
(g) Panama
4 0  0.323  83.576  79.508  47.707  0.000  0.000
3 1  0.235  42.641  40.886  29.804  0.001  0.001
2 2  0.128  14.546  13.868  15.408  0.068  0.086
1 3  0.001  0.104  0.099  3.841  0.747  0.754
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Table  7  Exclusion  tests.
(a)  Argentina (b)  Brazil
r  DFG  5%CV  LEMBI M ARG LEAI  INF  LDEBT X r  DFG  5%CV  LEMBI M BRA LII  INF  LDEBT X
1  1  3.841 0.177  [0.674] 0.160  [0.689] 46.649  [0.000] 0.148  [0.701] 1  1  3.841 1.682  [0.195] 8.402  [0.004] 9.067  [0.003] 2.262  [0.133]
2 2  5.991 15.169  [0.001] 1.422  [0.491] 61.128  [0.000] 3.340  [0.188] 2  2  5.991 4.477  [0.107] 21.536  [0.000] 23.366  [0.000] 5.754  [0.056]
3 3  7.815 21.412  [0.000] 8.798  [0.032] 64.226  [0.000] 11.312  [0.010] 3  3  7.815 12.327  [0.006] 32.972  [0.000] 34.786  [0.000] 15.161  [0.002]
(c) Colombia (d)  Chile
r  DFG  5%CV  LEMBI CO LIMACO  INF  LDEBT X r  DFG  5%CV  LEMBI CH LIPI  INF  LDEBT X
1  1  3.841 6.244  [0.012] 11.050  [0.001] 2.505  [0.113] 3.386  [0.066] 1  1  3.841 3.280  [0.070] 10.785  [0.001] 12.279  [0.000] 4.749  [0.029]
2 2  5.991 6.793  [0.033] 18.160  [0.000] 17.016  [0.000] 3.791  [0.150] 2  2  5.991  5.856  [0.053]  16.712  [0.000]  18.250  [0.000]  8.666  [0.013]
3 3  7.815 18.919  [0.000] 30.095  [0.000] 29.917  [0.000] 15.027  [0.002] 3  3  7.815  8.233  [0.041]  19.840  [0.000]  21.572  [0.000]  12.050  [0.007]
(e) Mexico (f)  Ecuador
r  DFG  5%CV  LEMBI  MX  IAI  INF  LDEBT  X  r  DFG  5%CV  LEMBI  M  EC  LEAI  INF  LDEBT  X
1  1  3.841 0.002  [0.961] 0.015  [0.904] 32.296  [0.000] 0.726  [0.394] 1  1  3.841  1.391  [0.238]  0.019  [0.891]  32.046  [0.000]  0.176  [0.675]
2 2  5.991 1.885  [0.390] 0.048  [0.976] 38.251  [0.000] 4.239  [0.120] 2  2  5.991  1.429  [0.490]  10.899  [0.004]  40.450  [0.000]  9.598  [0.008]
3 3  7.815 9.470  [0.024] 8.479  [0.037] 47.469  [0.000] 13.480  [0.004] 3  3  7.815  10.337  [0.016]  20.355  [0.000]  47.864  [0.000]  15.872  [0.001]
(g) Panama
r  DFG  5%CV  LEMBI  PANA  IREV  C  INF  LDEBT  X
1  1  3.841  1.318  [0.251] 2.971  [0.085] 11.776  [0.001]  10.982  [0.001]
2 2  5.991  11.760  [0.003] 13.278  [0.001]  20.549  [0.000]  15.019  [0.001]
3 3  7.815  25.313  [0.000]  25.599  [0.000]  34.818  [0.000]  29.224  [0.001]
Note: LR-test, Chi-square (r), P-values in brackets.
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Table  8  Long  run  relationships.
Country  CI(1)  CI(2)
Argentina  Inf
Brazil  Lii  −  0.18221*Inf  +  0.1918*LDebt  X
Colombia  LEmbi  co  −  1.0232*LIMACO  −  2.4449*Inf
Chile LEmbi  ch  +  0.07898*LDebt  X  −  0.2549*Inf
Mexico  Inf
Ecuador  Inf
0.61532*Inf  +  LDebt  X  −  0.44483*LRev  c
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ogarithms  except  inﬂation;  recall  from  Section  3.1  that  the
ariable  capturing  the  growth  expectations  (eai)  changes
epending  on  the  country  in  question.  Second,  we  carried
ut  the  residual  analysis  shown  properly  in  Table  5
Here  we  detail  the  dummies  included  for  each  country:
Argentina:  The  dummy  dum0111p  (2001:11)  takes  into
ccount  the  signiﬁcant  fall  in  the  Global  EMBI  due  to  the
urrency  crisis  sparked  by  Argentina’s  abandoning  of  the
urrency  board,  following  public  debt  default.9 Dum0202p
nd  dum0204p  variables  capture  the  consequences  of
evaluation  that  generated  inﬂation  pressures  (ECLAC,
002).  The  dum0504p  was  included  to  normalize  debt  x
esiduals  since  at  that  date  external  debt  experienced  a
harp  decrease  when  Argentina  launched  a  debt  exchange  in
005.10 Brazil:  dum0211p  is  included  to  normalize  the  debt  x
esiduals.  After  the  1999  devaluation  on  the  public  debt
enominated  in  US  dollars,  Brazil’s  debt  increased  substan-
ially,  reaching  50%  of  total  public  debt  at  the  end  of  2002.11
olombia:  The  objective  of  dum0405p  is  to  normalize  the
MBI  residuals;  three  dummies  dum0901p,  dum0904p  and
um0907p  represent  the  impact  of  the  2008--2009  global
risis  on  Colombia’s  economic  activity  (ECLAC,  2009).  Chile:
um0405p  which  normalizes  the  EMBI  residuals  and  the
um0901p  which  normalizes  the  economic  activity  variable
ipi)  are  incorporated  in  the  analysis.  Mexico:  dum0405p  is
lso  included  in  order  to  eliminate  the  outliers  of  the  EMBI’s
esiduals.  Ecuador:  Five  permanent  dummies  need  to  be
ncluded.  Whilst  dum0906p  is  related  to  Ecuador  default
n  2009,12 dum0811p  is  introduced  to  jointly  explain  the
ebt  x  and  the  EMBI  evolution.  The  rest  of  dummies  are
um0109p  and  dum0301p  which  are  needed  to  normalize
nﬂation  residuals.13 Panama:  The  dum0401p  normalizes
esiduals  of  inﬂation.  Prices  decreased  in  the  ﬁrst  quarter
9 In April 1991 the Convertibility Plan was launched, which pegged
he peso 1-to-1 to the US dollar. This plan was replaced with a
ual exchange rate regime based on an ofﬁcial exchange rate of
.4 pesos per dollar for public sector and tradable transactions,
hile other transactions were conducted at market rates. By June
002 the exchange rate reached 4 pesos per dollar (Kaminsky et al.,
009; Mourelle, 2010).
10 See Hornbeck (2013).
11 See Giambiagi and Ronci (2004).
12 In June 2009 the Correa government defaulted on $3.2 billion of
oreign public debt, and then completed a buyback of 91 per cent
f the defaulted bonds (Sandoval and Weisbrot, 2009).
13 Inﬂation only achieved a stable level in Ecuador after the ﬁrst
uarter of 2003.
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f  2004,  but  the  trend  reverted  afterward  due  to  the  rise
n  oil  prices  and  other  import  products  (ECLAC,  2004).
The  dum0810p  (along  with  dum0811p  only  for  Ecuador)
s  common  to  all  the  endogenous  variables  since  it  is  related
o  the  start  of  the  world  ﬁnancial  crisis  (the  US  ﬁnancial
nstitution  Lehman  Brothers  collapsed  in  September  2008
nd  affected  the  EMBI  evolution  of  all  emerging  countries
ncluded  in  this  study).  Dummies  such  as  dum0405p  and
um0901p  might  explain  contagion  effects  between  Chile,
olombia  and  Mexico.14 Dum0405p  captures  the  incidence
f  global  factors  such  as  a  fall  in  international  interest
ates,  which  we  can  proxy  using  the  US  Treasury  10-year
ield15 (Fig.  3  shows  that  Treasury  bonds  yields  went  down
n  2004:05).
Following  Eichengreen  and  Mody  (1998),  we  assume  that
he  relationship  between  the  US  Treasury  bond  rates  and
14 Several articles have presented empirical evidence of contagion
ffects within these countries. For instance, based on the esti-
ation of a multivariate regression model, Mathur et al. (2002)
onclude that there were spillover contagion effects from the Mex-
can market to the Chilean market during the 1994 peso crisis.
oreover, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) study whether capital
ontrols affect the link between domestic and foreign stock mar-
et prices and interest rates, and ﬁnd that equity prices are more
nternationally linked than interest rates.
15 McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) ﬁnd high correlations of common
actors with S&P500, US Treasury yield curve and oil prices.
D
ollarization
 and
 the
 relationship
 betw
een
 EM
BI
 and
 fundam
entals
 
25
Table  9  Econometric  results.
(a)  Argentina
Variable  equation DLEmbi arg DLeai  Dinf  DLDebt X
DLEmbi arg 1 0.4745  (0.0729)  [6.51] 0.055  (0.0178)  [3.11] 0.0650  (0.2797)  [0.233] −0.2536  (0.084)  [−3.02]
DLeai 1 0.2267  (0.4613)  [0.492] −0.0911  (0.1127)  [−0.809] 1.5977  (1.769)  [0.903] 0.386  (0.5317)  [0.727]
Dinf 1 −0.00607  (0.0142)  [−0.426] −0.0024  (0.0034)  [−0.697] −0.1776  (0.054)  [−3.35] 0.0097  (0.0164)  [0.593]
DLDebt X 1 0.1185  (0.0876)  [1.40] 0.0264  (0.0207)  [1.28] −0.3997  (0.3251)  [−1.23] −0.1450  (0.097)  [−1.48]
CI(1) 1* 0.00036  (0.0111)  [0.0329] 0.00144  (0.00272)  [0.531] −0.3642  (0.0427)  [−8.53] −0.0088  (0.0128)  [−0.69]
Dum0111p −0.2780  (0.0689)  [−4.03] −0.0154  (0.01683)  [−0.917] −0.1857  (0.2643)  [−0.703] −0.0372  (0.079)  [−0.469]
Dum0202p 0.0959  (0.07146)  [1.34] 0.0027  (0.0174)  [0.155] 1.2090  (0.2740)  [4.41] −0.0299  (0.082)  [−0.364]
Dum0204p −0.0425  (0.0707)  [−0.602] 0.022  (0.01728)  [1.30] 3.9607  (0.2713)  [14.6] 0.0106  (0.081)  [0.13]
Dum0504p −0.1002  (0.0694)  [−1.44] 0.0100  (0.0169)  [0.595] −0.5195  (0.2663)  [−1.95] −0.409  (0.080)  [−5.12]
Dum0810p −0.4681  (0.0688)  [−6.80] 0.0077  (0.01682)  [0.459] 0.0541  (0.2641)  [0.205] 0.073  (0.079)  [0.92]
(b) Brazil
Variable  equation DLEmbi br DLii  Dinf  DLDebt X
DLEmbi br 1 0.2413  (0.0968)  [2.49] −0.3561  (0.1317)  [−2.70] −0.3595  (0.3619)  [−0.993] 0.6114  (0.2537)  [2.41]
DLEmbi br  2 −0.0300  (0.0993)  [−0.303] 0.1743  (0.1352)  [1.29]  −0.4834  (0.3714)  [−1.30]  0.1667  (0.2604)  [0.640]
DLii 1 0.1173  (0.0988)  [1.19] −0.0219  (0.1345)  [−0.163]  −1.206  (0.3696)  [−3.26]  −0.7832  (0.2591)  [−3.02]
DLii 2 0.0645  (0.0899)  [0.718] 0.4152  (0.1224)  [3.39]  −0.3957  (0.3363)  [−1.18]  −0.9867  (0.2358)  [−4.19]
Dinf 1 −0.0212  (0.0225)  [−0.942] −0.0352  (0.0307)  [−1.15]  −0.2212  (0.0843)  [−2.62]  0.03738  (0.0591)  [0.632]
Dinf 2  0.0392  (0.0208)  [1.89]  −0.0917  (0.0282)  [−3.25]  −0.1435  (0.0777)  [−1.85]  0.0879  (0.0545)  [1.61]
DLDebt X  1  0.0171  (0.0451)  [0.379]  −0.0441  (0.0614)  [−0.719]  −0.0632  (0.1688)  [−0.375]  −0.4393  (0.1183)  [−3.71]
DLDebt X  2  0.0655  (0.0444)  [1.48]  0.0508  (0.0604)  [0.841]  0.0320  (0.1662)  [0.193]  −0.2745  (0.1165)  [−2.36]
CI(1) 1*  −0.0612  (0.074)  [−0.819]  −0.4247  (0.1018)  [−4.17]  1.104  (0.2797)  [3.95]  0.6363  (0.1961)  [3.25]
Dum0211p 0.1891  (0.0453)  [4.17]  −0.0553  (0.0617)  [−0.898]  1.1154  (0.1696)  [6.58]  0.2762  (0.1189)  [2.32]
Dum0810p −0.1312  (0.0433)  [−3.03]  0.0228  (0.0589)  [0.387]  0.0279  (0.1621)  [0.172]  0.0769  (0.1137)  [0.677]
(c) Colombia
Variable  equation DLEmbi co DLIMACO  Dinf  DLDebt X
DLEmbi  co  1  0.1520  (0.095)  [1.60]  1.1126  (0.5134)  [2.17]  −1.15585  (0.7058)  [−1.64]  −0.4547  (0.3327)  [−1.37]
DLIMACO 1  −0.01669  (0.008016)  [−2.08]  −0.5392  (0.0433)  [−12.5]  0.037718  (0.05953)  [0.634]  −0.02614  (0.02806)  [−0.932]
Dinf 1  0.01621  (0.01507)  [1.08]  0.1390  (0.06141)  [1.71]  −0.184651  (0.1119)  [−1.65]  −0.03471  (0.0527)  [−0.658]
DLDebt X  1  0.01487  (0.02810)  [0.501]  −0.3494  (0.1518)  [−2.30]  −0.097537  (0.2087)  [−0.467]  −0.4635  (0.09839)  [−4.71]
CI(1) 1*  −0.00061  (0.00306)  [−0.202]  0.1247  (0.01655)  [7.54]  0.03288  (0.02275)  [1.45]  −0.005683  (0.01072)  [−0.53]
Dum0405p −0.1057  (0.02889)  [−3.66]  0.02470  (0.1561)  [0.158]  0.16086  (0.2145)  [0.75]  0.00572  (0.1011)  [0.0566]
Dum0810p −0.1548  (0.03011)  [−5.14]  −0.3675  (0.1626)  [−2.26]  0.5895  (0.2236)  [2.64]  0.028015  (0.1054)  [0.266]
Dum0901p −0.00769  (0.030)  [−0.255]  −0.8094  (0.1631)  [−4.96]  −0.1852  (0.2243)  [−0.826]  0.1348  (0.1057)  [1.28]
Dum0904p 0.02359  (0.02929)  [0.805]  −1.4419  (0.1582)  [−9.11]  −0.02224  (0.2175)  [−0.102]  0.1485  (0.1025)  [1.45]
Dum0907p −0.01486  (0.03016)  [−0.493]  −2.3418  (0.1629)  [−14.4]  0.15916  (0.2240)  [0.711]  0.00464  (0.1056)  [0.0440]
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Table  9  (Continued)
(d)  Chile
Variable  equation  DLEmbi  ch  DLipi  Dinf  DLDebt  X
DLEmbi  ch  1  0.2574  (0.0855)  [3.01]  0.2394  (0.1278)  [1.87]**  −0.0509  (1.294)  [−0.039]  −0.8188  (0.4075)  [−2.01]
DLEmbi ch  2  −0.2627  (0.08522)  [−3.08]  −0.077  (0.1274)  [−0.611]  3.3522  (1.29)  [2.60]  −0.5122  (0.4061)  [−1.26]
DLipi 1  −0.04337  (0.06672)  [−0.650]  −0.3102  (0.099)  [−3.11]  −0.8168  (1.010)  [−0.809]  0.0184  (0.3179)  [0.0582]
DLipi 2  0.0069  (0.0635)  [0.109]  −0.02408  (0.09504)  [−0.253]  −2.6025  (0.9622)  [−2.70]  −0.153  (0.3030)  [−0.508]
Dinf 1  −0.0024  (0.0068)  [−0.362]  −0.0049  (0.010)  [−0.481]  −0.2602  (0.1042)  [−2.50]  −0.054  (0.03281)  [−1.65]
Dinf 2  −0.001122  (0.0067)  [−0.166]  0.006  (0.01011)  [0.665]  −0.3613  (0.1023)  [−3.53]  −0.0704  (0.03222)  [−2.19]
DLDebt X  1  −0.0069  (0.02465)  [−0.280]  −0.0200  (0.0368)  [−0.545]  −0.1078  (0.3731)  [−0.289]  −0.6481  (0.1175)  [−5.52]
DLDebt X  2  −0.0063  (0.0244)  [−0.261]  0.03496  (0.0364)  [0.959]  −0.1842  (0.3692)  [−0.499]  −0.3492  (0.1163)  [−3.00]
CI(1) 1* −0.007875  (0.0080)  [−0.976]  0.0018  (0.0120)  [0.155]  0.0939  (0.1222)  [0.769]  −0.0318  (0.0384)  [−0.829]
Dum0405p −0.0995  (0.02314)  [−4.30]  −0.0123  (0.0345)  [−0.357]  0.0668  (0.3502)  [0.191]  −0.0393  (0.110)  [−0.356]
Dum0810p −0.1611  (0.02433)  [−6.62]  −0.01164  (0.0363)  [−0.320]  0.0174  (0.3682)  [0.0473]  0.1631  (0.1159)  [1.41]
Dum0901p −0.0058  (0.02565)  [−0.227]  −0.2303  (0.0383)  [−6.01]  −0.5219  (0.3881)  [−1.34]  0.1623  (0.1222)  [1.33]
(e) Mexico
Variable  equation  DLEmbi  mx  Diai  Dinf  DLDebt  X
DLEmbi  mx  1  0.1148  (0.0752)  [1.53]  0.9876  (11.12)  [0.0888]  −3.0817  (1.039)  [−2.97]  −0.5085  (0.3859)  [−1.32]
DLEmbi mx  2  −0.4156  (0.0714)  [−5.82]  10.1342  (10.56)  [0.960]  0.8405  (0.9866)  [0.852]  −0.4222  (0.3665)  [−1.15]
DLEmbi mx  3  0.0448  (0.0774)  [0.580]  29.4665  (11.45)  [2.57]  −0.8210  (1.069)  [−0.768]  −1.5534  (0.3973)  [−3.91]
DLiai 1  −0.0004  (0.0006)  [−0.679]  −0.8000  (0.1026)  [−7.80]  0.0213  (0.0095)  [2.22]  0.0046  (0.0035)  [1.30]
DLiai 2  0.0004  (0.0008)  [0.602]  −0.5716  (0.1198)  [−4.77]  0.0207  (0.0111)  [1.86]  0.0027  (0.0041)  [0.663]
DLiai 3  0.0001  (0.0006)  [0.242]  −0.3033  (0.1031)  [2.94]  0.0079  (0.0096)  [0.82]  −0.0017  (0.0035)  [−0.486]
Dinf 1  −0.0070  (0.0098)  [−0.716]  1.0485  (1.452)  [0.722]  0.3456  (0.1356)  [2.55]  [1.34]  −0.1244  (0.0503)  [−2.47]
Dinf 2  0.0132  (0.0088)  [1.49]  −0.9278  (1.315)  [−0.706]  0.2636  (0.1228)  [2.15]  −0.0649  (0.0456)  [−1.42]
Dinf 3  0.0017  (0.0070)  [0.252]  0.4255  (1.045)  [0.407]  0.2831  (0.0975)  [2.90]  0.0252  (0.0362)  [0.696]
DLDebt X  1  −0.0080  (0.0203)  [−0.393]  −4.9697  (3.009)  [−1.65]  0.2667  (0.2811)  [0.949]  −0.2910  (0.1044)  [−2.79]
DLDebt X  2  0.0114  (0.0214)  [0.533]  −6.9052  (3.165)  [−2.18]  1.3002  (0.2957)  [4.40]  0.0324  (0.1098)  [0.296]
DLDebt X  3  0.0293  (0.0214)  [1.37]  −11.0014  (3.165)  [−3.48]  0.0677  (0.2957)  [0.229]  0.1342  (0.1099)  [1.22]
CI(1) 1*  0.0003  (0.0112)  [0.0270]  1.4923  (1.661)  [0.898]  −0.9421  (0.1552)  [−6.07]  0.1206  (0.0576)  [2.09]
Dum0810p −0.1394  (0.0161)  [−8.66]  −0.5771  (2.379)  [−0.243]  0.0734  (0.2223)  [0.331]  −0.0255  (0.0825)  [−0.309]
Dum0405p −0.0605  (0.0164)  [−3.68]  −2.3491  (2.431)  [−0.966]  −0.1993  (0.2271)  [−0.878]  −0.0531  (0.0843)  [−0.630]
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Table  9  (Continued)
(f)  Ecuador
Variable  equation DLEmbi ec DLeai  Dinf  DLDebt X
DLEmbi ec 1 0.2528  (0.072)  [3.50] −0.086  (0.1061)  [−0.819] −0.0027  (0.0039)  [−0.700] −0.2698  (0.1149)  [−2.35]
DLeai 1 −0.031  (0.0604)  [−0.527] −0.6107  (0.088)  [−6.88] −0.0080  (0.0033)  [−2.42] 0.0937  (0.096)  [0.0976]
Dinf 1 1.0619  (1.017)  [1.04] −0.1161  (1.493)  [−0.077] −0.1312  (0.055)  [−2.35] −1.504  (1.616)  [−0.931]
DLDebt X 1 0.125  (0.0613)  [2.04] −0.0820  (0.089)  [−0.911] 0.0009  (0.0033)  [0.273] −0.2481  (0.097)  [−2.55]
CI(1) 1* −0.6925  (1.073)  [−0.645] 0.0627  (1.575)  [0.0399] −0.4235  (0.059)  [−7.17] −0.7155  (1.705)  [−0.42]
Dum0109p 0.0125  (0.0569)  [0.221] 0.0596  (0.083)  [0.714] 0.013  (0.0031)  [4.22] −0.089  (0.09)  [−0.987]
Dum0301p 0.083  (0.056)  [1.46] 0.0077  (0.083)  [0.0931] 0.017  (0.0031)  [5.43] 0.0109  (0.09)  [0.121]
Dum0810p −0.4618  (0.058)  [−7.93] −0.1432  (0.0854)  [−1.68] −0.0047  (0.0032)  [−1.49] 0.200  (0.092)  [2.16]
Dum0811p −0.4984  (0.065)  [−7.62] −0.0083  (0.096)  [−0.08] −0.0071  (0.0035)  [−1.97] 0.0721  (0.1039)  [0.69]
Dum0906p 0.1389  (0.056)  [2.46] −0.0377  (0.082)  [−0.455] −0.0007  (0.0031)  [−0.257] −0.410  (0.089)  [−4.92]
(g) Panama
Variable  equation  DLEmbi  pa  DLrev  c  Dinf  DLDebt  X
DLEmbi  pa  1  0.2995  (0.074)  [4.00]  0.04671  (0.1630)  [0.287]  3.8661  (1.595)  [2.42]  −0.4881  (0.6171)  [−0.791]
DLrev c  1  −0.0387  (0.0456)  [−0.849]  −0.1722  (0.0992)  [−1.74]  0.7122  (0.9714)  [0.733]  0.1170  (0.3757)  [0.311]
Dinf 1  −0.0058  (0.0043)  [−1.33]  −0.0228  (0.0095)  [−2.40]  −0.2284  (0.093)  [−2.45]  0.0769  (0.036)  [2.14]
DLDebt X  1  −0.00147  (0.01302)  [−0.113]  0.0337  (0.02832)  [1.19]  0.6640  (0.2772)  [2.40]  −0.0085  (0.1072)  [−0.919]
CI(1) 1*  −0.0988  (0.028)  [−3.51]  0.1816  (0.0612)  [2.97]  −0.0633  (0.5992)  [−0.106]  −0.1927  (0.2318)  [−0.832]
CI(2) 1*  0.0067  (0.0092)  [0.737]  0.00694  (0.0200)  [0.346]  −0.9952  (0.1964)  [−5.07]  −0.2118  (0.0759)  [−2.79]
Dum0401p 0.02503  (0.02011)  [1.25]  −0.00535  (0.0437)  [−0.122]  −1.9271  (0.4283)  [−4.50]  0.3987  (0.1656)  [2.41]
Dum0810p −0.1819  (0.0202)  [−8.99]  0.0221  (0.044)  [0.0502]  −0.4506  (0.4310)  [−1.05]  0.1666  (0.1667)  [1.00]
Notes: Std-errors are in parenthesis and t-values in brackets. *Argentina: CI(1) = Inf.
Notes: Std-errors are in parenthesis and t-values in brackets.*Brazil: CI(1) = Lii - 0.18221*Inf + 0.1918*LDebt X.
Notes: Std-errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Colombia: CI(1) = LEMBI co -- 1.0232*LIMACO -- 2.4449*Inf.
Notes: Std-errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Chile: C(1) = LEMBI ch + 0.07898*LDebt X -- 0.2549*Inf. **When non-signiﬁcant dummies were excluded this coefﬁcient
becomes signiﬁcant.
Notes: Std-errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Mexico: C(1) = Inf.
Notes: Std-errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Ecuador: CI(1) = Inf 1.
Notes: Std-errors are in parentheses and t-values in brackets. *Panama: CI(1) = -0.79176*Lrev c + LEmbi pana and CI(2) = 0.61532*Inf + LDebt X -- 0.44483*LRev c.
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Table  10  Comparative  analysis  taking  only  the  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients  into  account.
Variable  Argentina  Brazil  Colombia  Chile  Mexico  Ecuador  Panama
Dependent  variable:  DLEMBI  speciﬁc  country
DLEMBI  X  X  X  X  X  X
DLEAI X
DINF
DLDEBT  X  X
DUM0810 X  X  X  X  X  X  X
DUM0405 X  X  X
DUM0211  X
CI() X  X(CI1)  (CI(1))
Dependent variable:  DLEAI*
DLEMBI  X  X  X  X(**)  X
DLEAI X  X  X  X  X
DINF X  X
DDEBT X X  X
DUM0810  X
DUM0901  X  X
CI() X  X  X(CI1)
Dependent variable:  DINF
DLEMBI  X  X  X
DLEAI X  X  X  X
DINF X  X  X  X  X  X
DLDEBT X  X  X
DUM0810 X
CI() X  X  X  X  X(CI2)  (CI(2))
Dependent variable:  DLDEBT  X
DLEMBI  X  X  X  X  X
DLEAI X
DINF  X  X  X
DLDEBT X  X  X  X  X  X
DUM0211 X
DUM0810  X
CI() X  X  X(CI2)  (CI(2))
Note: The results shown are the ones obtained when non-signiﬁcant dummies were eliminated. CI(): Speciﬁes only the variables included
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simultaneous  equation  system.  Its  results  are  summarizedin each long run relationship, which are described in Table 8. *T
non-signiﬁcant dummies were excluded this coefﬁcient becomes 
merging  bond  prices  is  explained  in  terms  of  demand.16 On
he  demand  side,  when  Treasury  bonds  rates  go  up  (their
rices  go  down),  there  will  be  a  tendency  among  investors
o  substitute  emerging  bonds  by  US  Treasury  bonds,  and  so
he  EMBI  price  falls.  Finally,  dummy  dum0901p  represents
he  vulnerability  of  Chile  and  Colombia  with  respect  to  the
ther  countries  included  in  the  sample  during  the  global
conomic  crisis  of  2008--2009.
Third,  we  determined  the  rank  of  cointegration;  Table  6
hows  the  results  of  Johansen’s  (1996)  test,  which  concludes
hat  all  the  countries  reﬂect  the  presence  of  just  one  cointe-
rated  vector;  so  the  rank  of  their  long  run  matrix  is  equal  to
 (with  the  exception  of  Panama,  which  matrix’s  rank  is  2).
16 On the supply side, when Treasury bond rates go up, the
ncreased debt servicing cost decreases the supply of US external
ebt. This in turn increases the price of emerging bonds averaged
y the EMBI.
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uriable changes depending on the country (see Table 4). **When
cant.
Fourth,  we  test  and  impose  over-identifying  restrictions
n  the  long  run  structure  (beta  vectors)  in  order  to  have  only
igniﬁcant  coefﬁcients.  Table  7  shows  the  tests  of  exclusion
or  the  seven  countries,  and  Table  8  the  ﬁnal  cointegra-
ion  relationships  for  each  of  the  countries.  These  long
un  relationships  will  be  added  as  another  predetermined
ariable  into  the  simultaneous  equation  system  and,  along
ith  dummies  and  lagged  differenced  variables,  we  will  test
hether  their  coefﬁcients  are  signiﬁcant  or  not.17
Finally  as  a  ﬁfth  step,  we  test  the  CVAR  model  as  an  Table  9a--g.  We  present  the  signiﬁcance  of  the  t-values
or  the  different  coefﬁcients  in  order  to  highlight  the
17 The ﬁrst four steps were performed using the software CATS.
ecursive estimation to check parameters stability is available
nder request.
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cDollarization  and  the  relationship  between  EMBI  and  fundam
differences  between  the  countries18 --  speciﬁcally,  between
dollarized  and  non-dollarized  countries.
4.2.  Interpretation  of  the  results
As  mentioned,  the  results  of  the  parameter  estimations  that
describe  the  short  run  effects  over  variables  are  presented
in  Table  9a--g.  Speciﬁcally,  Table  9a--e  correspond  to  non-
dollarized  countries  and  Table  9f  and  g  to  the  dollarized
ones  (Ecuador  and  Panama).  In  these  tables,  the  presence
of  t-values  makes  it  easy  to  distinguish  between  signiﬁcant
and  non-signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients  across  the  seven  emerging
countries  in  the  sample.
Table  10  presents  the  comparative  analysis  of  the  seven
emerging  countries.
Looking  across  the  columns  in  Table  9a--g,  the  following
conclusions  can  be  drawn:  (1)  The  Emerging  Bond  Market
Index  (EMBI)  is  generally  affected  by  global  factors  (proxied
by  dum0810p  which  captures  the  beginning  of  the  ﬁnancial
crisis)  and  their  own  shocks,  since  all  the  countries  in  the
sample,  except  Colombia,  have  a  signiﬁcant  lagged  DLEMBI
coefﬁcient  in  their  EMBI  equations.  Debt  x  does  not  seem  to
be  relevant  for  explaining  the  EMBI  behaviour,  unless  a coun-
try  has  defaulted  on  its  debt  obligations  (as  Ecuador  did);  (2)
Economic  activity  is  affected  by  the  EMBI  in  all  countries  but
dollarized  ones;  which  represents  the  ﬁrst  important  ﬁnding
of  this  study,  suggesting  that  in  non-dollarized  countries,
debt-servicing  costs  may  have  an  important  impact  on  the
evolution  of  the  economy;  (3)  In  most  cases,  inﬂation  fol-
lows  a  long  run  relationship.  In  our  opinion,  this  is  the
second  important  ﬁnding  of  this  research,  since  it  means
that  a  country  does  not  need  to  be  dollarized  to  reach  sta-
ble  inﬂation  levels.  Inﬂation  targeting  might  be  behind  the
non-dollarized  countries’  results19;  (4)  In  general,  investors
look  at  the  evolution  of  the  EMBI  to  make  their  next  deci-
sions  regarding  sovereign  bond  debt  investment.  Colombia
and  Panama  are  the  exceptions;  (5)  In  general,  the  EMBI
does  not  follow  a  long  run  relationship  (with  the  exception
of  Mexico  and  Panama).  (6)  Finally,  it  seems  that  conta-
gion  effects  are  present  in  only  three  countries:  Colombia,
Chile,  and  Mexico.  These  inter-relationships  are  captured
by  dum0405p  and  dum0901p  variables.  The  former  affects
the  EMBI  in  the  three  countries,  whilst  the  latter  affects  the
economic  activity  in  just  the  ﬁrst  two  countries.
5. ConclusionsThe  two  main  ﬁndings  of  this  paper  are:  (i)  economic  activity
is  affected  by  the  EMBI  in  all  the  countries  except  the  dol-
larized  ones;  and  (ii)  inﬂation  follows  a  long  run  relationship
for  most  of  the  sample  (the  exceptions  being  Colombia  and
18 This econometric work was carried out with the software Ox
Metrics.
19 Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) analyze the experience of
Latin America countries with inﬂation targeting regimes and classify
Brazil and Chile as full-ﬂedged inﬂation targeting, whilst Colom-
bia and Mexico are classiﬁed as partial inﬂation targeting regimes.
These authors emphasize the substantial progress of these countries
to achieve low one digit inﬂation levels without output sacriﬁces.
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hile),  showing  that  a  country  does  not  need  to  be  dollarized
o  achieve  a  stable  inﬂation  level.  Our  results  suggest  that
n  Latin  America  countries  the  pricing  of  risk  (EMBI)  depends
ostly  on  global  factors.  Nevertheless,  its  evolution  affects
oreign  lenders’  prospective  debt  investments,  as  well  as
omestic  economic  activity,  except  in  dollarized  countries.
These  results  may  suggest  the  following  conclusions.
irst,  dollarization  may  ensure  that  currency  mismatches
ill  not  occur  during  domestic  economic  crises;  thus,  the
MBI  is  more  stable  and  these  countries’  access  to  debt  mar-
ets  is  easier  due  to  their  lower  vulnerability  to  EMBI  shocks.
econd,  dollarized  countries  are  not  as  dependent  on  inter-
ational  reserves  (they  use  the  US  dollar  both  to  develop
heir  economies  and  to  pay  their  debts),  as  their  non-
ollarized  counterparts  which  need  international  reserves
o  pay  their  debts  but  use  national  currencies  to  develop
heir  economies.  This  comparative  analysis  between  two
ollarized  and  ﬁve  non-dollarized  countries  suggests  that
ollarization  may  isolate  the  evolution  of  the  broadest
merging  market  debt  benchmark,  the  EMBI.  These  results
re  particularly  interesting  since  there  are  some  non-
ollarized  Latin  American  countries  which  are  already  doing
relatively)  well  on  their  own.  We  think  that  they  should
ncourage  ﬁscal  discipline  in  order  to  avoid  a  debt  crisis
ituation  since,  in  a  default  context,  due  to  the  interre-
ationship  between  their  economic  activity  and  the  EMBI
volution;  they  would  face  much  more  trouble  than  dollar-
zed  economies.
Besides,  our  results  also  suggest  that  in  the  long  run,  non-
ollarized  countries  with  inﬂation  targeting  policies  achieve
imilar  levels  of  inﬂation  to  those  obtained  by  their  dol-
arized  counterparts.  This  result  is  consistent  with  those
resented  by  other  authors  (Bernanke  and  Mishkin,  1997;
ernanke  et  al.,  1999).  The  novelty  is  to  reach  this  conclu-
ion  by  means  of  the  cointegrated  VAR  approach  which
dentiﬁes  long-run  relationships,  including  a  stationary  inﬂa-
ion  variable  in  non-dollarized  countries.
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